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DRAFT 11/7/13
Unitary Taxation and International Tax Rules
Reuven S. Avi-Yonah1
Zachee Pouga Tinhaga2

Any proposal to adopt Unitary Taxation (UT) of multinationals has to
contend with whether such taxation is compatible with existing
international tax rules and in particular with the bilateral tax treaty
network. Indeed, some researchers have argued that the separate
accounting (SA) method and the arm’s length standard are so
embodied in the treaties that they form part of customary international
law and are binding even in the absence of a treaty. In this paper we
will argue that UT can be compatible with most of the existing tax
treaties, and that developing countries in particular can implement it
in most cases with or without a tax treaty.

1. UT and the Existing Treaty Network.
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Transfer pricing is currently governed by Article 9 of the treaties,
which assumes the SA method because it addresses the commercial or
financial relations between associated enterprises.3 If UT were
adopted, Article 9 would become irrelevant in those situations to
which UT applies (i.e., where a unitary business is found to exist)
because UT ignores the transactions between related parties, and
treats them instead as part of a single enterprise.

Instead, UT would be governed by Article 7. Under Article 5(7),
“[t]he fact that a company that is a resident of a Contracting State
controls or is controlled by a company that is a resident of the other
Contracting State … shall not of itself constitute either company a
permanent establishment of the other.” However, it is well established
that a dependent agent can be a permanent establishment (see Art.
5(5)), and whether an agent is dependent is based on whether the
principal exercises legal and economic control over the agent.4 “An

3

The quoted articles are identical in all the tax treaty models except when discussed in the text.
See, e.g., Roche Vitamins Europe Ltd v. Administracion General del Estado, Case No. STS/202/2012 (Spanish
Supreme Court Jan. 12, 2012) (Swiss principal had PE in Spain through an affiliated Spanish company; activity of
4
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agent that is subject to detailed instructions regarding the conduct of
its operations or comprehensive control by the enterprise is not
legally independent.”5

In the case of a modern, integrated MNE that operates as a unitary
business, a strong argument can be made in most cases that the parent
of the MNE exercises both legal and economic control over the
operations of the subsidiaries, especially where the subsidiaries bear
no real risk of loss and acquire goods and services exclusively or near
exclusively from the parent or other related corporations. The
existence of Intranets in most MNEs has resulted in most important
operational decisions being centralized. In that case, the subsidiaries
should be regarded as dependent agents of the parent. Such a finding

the subsidiary was directed organized and managed in a detailed manner by the principal); Salad Dressing, Fiscal
Court Baden-Wurttemberg, 3 K 54/93, Internationales Steuerrecht 1997 (Swiss principal had a PE at the premises of
an unrelated German contract manufacturer based on detailed instruction by principal); Milcal Media Limited, Court
of Appeal, Stockholm, Case nos. 7453-54-02 (2005) (Cyprus principal had a PE through Swedish subsidiary
because it was subject to detailed instructions and control); eFunds Corp. v. ADIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal,
Delhi, 2010; Lucent Technologies v. DCIT, Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, 2008 (US parent company had a
service PE in India); and the cases cited by LeGall, infra.
5
U.S. Treasury. Technical Explanation of United States Model Income Tax Convention. Washington: Government
Printing Office, Art. 5(6) (2006).
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is in fact made with increasing frequency in both developed and
developing countries.6

If the subsidiary is an agent of the parent, Art. 7(2) of the treaties
requires the attribution of the same profits to the subsidiary “that it
might be expected to make if it were a distinct and independent
enterprise engaged in the same or similar activities under the same or
similar conditions.” Arguably, the application of UT satisfies this
arm’s length condition because in the absence of precise comparables
(which almost never exist) it is not possible to determine exactly what
profits would have been attributable to the subsidiary under SA.

When the US adopted CPM and profit split in the 1994 transfer
pricing regulations, some countries objected that it was violating the
treaties because these methods did not rely on exact comparables to

6

Le Gall JP. (2007) The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Can a Subsidiary Be a Permanent
Establishment of its Foreign Parent? Commentary on Article 5, par. 7 of the OECD
Model Tax Convention. Tax Law Review 60: 179-214.
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find the arm’s length price. However, these objections soon subsided,
and even the OECD endorsed similar methods in its transfer pricing
guidelines. The US has always maintained that both CPM and profit
split satisfy the arm’s length standard despite the lack of precise
comparables (and in the case of profit split, using no comparables at
all to allocate any residual profits). Similarly, the US has maintained
that the “super-royalty rule” of IRC sec. 482 (which requires royalties
to be “commensurate with the income” from an intangible, and
therefore subject to periodic adjustment) is consistent with the arm’s
length standard, even though no comparables can be found to show
that such adjustments are ever made by unrelated parties.

Before the recent changes to the OECD MC, it was therefore quite
plausible to argue that UT was compatible with the treaties if the
subsidiary were as a factual matter legally or economically dependent
on the parent so as to constitute a PE. In addition, a country that
wished to adopt UT could rely on the language of the OECD MC Art.
7(4):

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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“Insofar as it has been customary in a Contracting State to
determine the profits to be attributed to a permanent establishment
on the basis of an apportionment of the total profits of the
enterprise to its various parts, nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude
that Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed by
such an apportionment as may be necessary; the method of
apportionment adopted shall, however, be such that the result shall
be in accordance with the principles contained in this Article.”

Since it can be argued that in the absence of comparables the result
reached under UT is equivalent to what could be reached under SA, this
language seems to permit the use of UT for dependent agent PEs.

However, the OECD in 2010 adopted changes to article 7 that may
make this argument more difficult to sustain. Specifically, the OECD
has adopted the “authorized OECD approach” to the attribution of
profits to PE that treats them as the equivalent to subsidiaries, and has

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
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suggested that the transfer pricing guidelines that explicitly reject UT
should be applied to PEs. In addition, the OECD has followed the US
lead and deleted article 7(4) from its MC. However, the UN model still
includes article 7(4).

Nevertheless, the vast majority of existing actual treaties have not been
revised to incorporate those changes. In particular, Appendix A shows
that many developing country treaties contain article 7(4), even when the
treaties are with OECD members. The Appendix lists 174 such treaties
by developing countries that contain this language, including recent
treaties such as India-Lithuania (2011) India-Nepal (2011) KoreaPanama (2010) and treaties with OECD members such as India-Sweden,
India-UK, Mexico-UK, and Sri Lanka-US. In all of those cases,
countries should be free to implement UT in accordance with the
analysis set out above.

Nor does the argument from customary international law impede such
effort. The argument is based on the contention that because SA and the

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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ALS are embodied in all of the treaties they should be considered
binding. But embodiment in the treaties is not enough to create a
customary international law ban on UT, since article 7(4) is embodied as
well. The key issue is what countries actually do, and many of them
follow UT approaches in practice. In addition, in this case countries
should be free to follow the UN Model which does not adopt the
changes made by the OECD, and which is also widely followed.

Finally, it can be argued that even the OECD may be revising its
approach. The authorized OECD approach may have marked the high
point of OECD commitment to SA. With the beginning of the BEPS
project, which is influenced by large developing countries like China
and India, it is likely that the OECD may be stepping back from its total
commitment to SA. Specifically, the potential adoption under BEPS of
country by country reporting (which is already required for extractive
industries in the US) can be the basis for implementation of UT.

2. UT and Developing Countries
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What can a developing country do to implement UT? If there is no
treaty, or if the treaty contains Art. 7(4) type language, the biggest
obstacle to implementation may be obtaining the information needed
to apply UT.

The recent redraft of the UN Transfer Pricing Manual recommends that
among the documentation which a tax administration should request for
a Transfer Pricing audit should be the “Group global consolidated basis
profit and loss statement and ratio of taxpayer's sales towards group
global sales for five years'” (para. 8.6.9.12). This provides a good basis
for application of UT. The rejection of UT in the OECD Transfer Pricing
Guidelines is based on its definition of FA as `applying a formula fixed
in advance'. This leaves considerable scope for adoption of UT
approaches with ad hoc formulas, which are not based on a fixed
formula.
Specifically, as discussed in Michael Durst’s work, allocation
according to operating expenses would be clearer and easier to

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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administer, and most importantly would fit within the current rules of
international tax. We have argued that in the context of the profit split
method, the residual profit cannot be allocated on the basis of
comparables and therefore can be allocated based on operating expenses
without deviating from the ALS. This would entail first assigning to
each country an estimated market return on the tax deductible expenses
incurred by the multinational group in that country.
Developing countries should therefore be encouraged to draft their
transfer pricing laws to include powers to adjust the accounts of any
foreign-owned local company or branch, if the Revenue Authority
considers that its accounts do not fairly reflect the profits earned locally,
to bring the taxable profits into line with those which such a business
would be expected to earn, having regard to (a) similar businesses either
in that country or elsewhere, and/or (b) the relationship of the local
business to the worldwide activities of the corporate group of which it is
a part. This would involve analysis and comparison of provisions in the
tax laws of appropriate countries.

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
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The transition from SA to UT is likely to be a long process, and it
may require ultimately renegotiating the treaties or even drafting a
multilateral treaty like the EU’s CCCTB. However, a good beginning
can be made now by exploring how developing countries can adopt UT
principles within the context of the existing treaty network. This paper
has tried to show that such approaches are quite feasible because most
developing countries are not bound by the authorized OECD approach to
article 7, and because even the OECD may be reconsidering its approach
in the context of the BEPS project.

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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DATE

ADOPTED VERSION OF ARTICLE 7:
7-4 LANGUAGE

INDIA &
Japan

March 7,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
New Zealand Oct. 17, 1986 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Singapore Jan. 24, 1994

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Israel Jan. 26, 1996

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Kuwait

June 15,
2006

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Lithuania July 26, 2011

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Luxemburg June 2, 2008

Art. 32
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Mexico

Sept. 10,
2007
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“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Mozambique

Sept. 30,
2010

Myanmar April 2, 2008

Namibia

Nepal

Norway

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Nov. 27,
2011

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Dec. 31,
1986

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Feb. 12,
1990

Taiwan July 12, 2011

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Feb. 15,
1997

Oman April 2, 1997

Philippines

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Serbia &
Feb. 8, 2006
Montenegro

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sri Lanka Jan. 27, 1982

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sweden June 7, 1988

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

June 18,
2008

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Tajikistan

Nov. 20,
2008

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Tanzania

May 27,
2011

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Thailand

Mar. 22,
1985

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Syria

United Kingdom Jan. 25, 1993

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

Art. 30
“…nothing in paragraphs (1) and (2) of this Article shall
preclude that Contracting State from determining the
profits to be taxed by such an apportionment as may be
necessary …”
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Ukraine April 7, 1999

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam Sept. 7, 1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

INDONESIA &
Netherlands Mar. 5, 1973

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Switzerland

Aug. 29,
1988

Art. 25
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Iran

April 30,
2004

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Japan Mar. 3, 1982

Kuwait

Mauritius

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

April 23,
1997

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Dec. 10,
1996

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Mexico Sept. 6, 2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Korea July 11, 2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

New Zealand

Mar. 25,
1987

June 18,

Philippines 1981

Poland Oct. 6, 1992

Portugal

July 9, 2003

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Slovakia Oct. 12, 2000 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Syria June 7, 1997

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Thailand

Mar. 25,
1981

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Tunisia

May 13,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Emirates

Nov. 30,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Kingdom April 5, 1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Ukraine

April 11,
1996

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Venezuela

Feb. 27,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam

Dec. 22,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Zimbabwe

May 30,
2001

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

KOREA &

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
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Syria

Feb. 21,
2000

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Mexico Oct. 16, 1994 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Malta

Mar. 25,
1997

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Romania Oct. 11, 1993 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sri Lanka

May 28,
1984

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Switzerland

Feb. 12,
1980

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Tunisia

Sept. 27,
1988

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Ukraine

Sept. 29,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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Russia

Sept. 26,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Myanmar

Feb. 22,
2002

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Oman

Sept. 23,
2005

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Panama Oct. 20, 2010 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Slovakia

Aug. 27,
2001

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Slovenia

April 25,
2005

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Thailand

Nov. 16,
2006

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Emirates

Sept. 23,
2003

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83
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Venezuela

June 26,
2006

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sept. 27,
1993

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

MEXICO &
Netherlands

Singapore Nov. 9, 1994

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Switzerland Aug. 3, 1993

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Kingdom June 2, 1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Mar. 23,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Poland

Nov. 30,
1998

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Portugal

Nov. 11,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Norway

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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Romania July 20, 2000

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Russia June 7, 2004

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Slovakia

May 13,
2006

Spain July 24, 1992

Sweden

Sept. 21,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Ukraine Jan. 23, 2012

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Venezuela Feb. 6, 1997

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

MOROCCO &
Pakistan

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83

May 18,
2006

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Poland Oct. 24, 1994 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Portugal

Sept. 29,
1997

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Romania

Sept. 11,
1981

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Jan. 9, 2007

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

Mar. 31,
1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Singapore

Switzerland

Ukraine July 13, 2007

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

NETHERLANDS&
Norway

Nov. 13,
1989

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
New Zealand Oct. 15, 1980 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2013
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South Africa

Mar. 15,
1971

Slovakia Mar. 4, 1974

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

May 29,
1991

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Oct. 5, 2009

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Mar. 24,
1982

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Oct. 6, 2010

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Poland

Sept. 20,
1979

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Portugal

Sept. 20,
1999

Art. 32
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Venezuela

Oman

Pakistan

Panama
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Qatar

April 24,
2008

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Taiwan

Feb. 27,
2001

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Mar.5, 1998

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Romania

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Saudi Arabia Oct. 13, 2008 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Slovenia

June 30,
2004

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sri Lanka

Nov. 17,
1982

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
May 8, 2007
Emirates

Uganda

Aug. 31,
2004
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Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Venezuela

May 29,
1991

Vietnam Jan. 24, 1995

Zambia

Zimbabwe

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Dec. 19,
1977

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

May 18,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

PHILIPPINES&
Poland Sept. 9, 1992

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Qatar

Dec. 14,
2008

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

Romania

May 18,
1994

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

April 26,
1995

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Russia
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Singapore Aug.1, 1997

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

ROMANIA&
San Marino

May 23,
2007

Switzerland Oct. 25, 1993

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Qatar Oct. 24, 1999 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Yugoslavia

May 16,
1996

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Russia

Sept. 27,
1993

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Switzerland

Nov. 15,
1995

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

RUSSIA&

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Yugoslavia Oct. 12, 1995 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Slovenia

Nov. 29,
1995

Sri Lanka Mar. 2, 1999

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sept. 17,
2000

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sept. 23,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Venezuela

Sept. 22,
2003

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam

May 27,
1993

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Syria

Thailand

SAUDI ARABIA&
Ukraine Sept. 2, 2011

Vietnam

April 10,
2010

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

SERBIA &

https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/83

28

Avi-Yonah:

Slovenia

June 11,
2003

Spain Mar. 9, 2009

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Turkey Oct. 12, 2005 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Jan 13, 2013
Emirates

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

SOUTH AFRICA&
Switzerland

Ukraine

July 3, 1967

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Aug. 28,
2003

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

June 21,
1979

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

SRI LANKA &
United Kingdom

United States

Mar. 14,
1985
As amended
by 2002
protocol
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Although this paragraph is not included in the U.S. Model, this is not a substantive
difference because the result provided by paragraph 4 is consistent with the rest of
Article 7.
The U.S. view is that paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 7 authorize the use of total profits
methods independently of paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the OECD Model because total
profits methods are acceptable methods for determining the arm’s length profits of
affiliated enterprises under Article 9. Accordingly, it is understood that, under
paragraph 2 of the Convention, it is permissible to use methods other than separate
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accounting to estimate the arm’s length profits of a permanent establishment where it is
necessary to do so for practical reasons, such as when the affairs of the permanent
establishment are so closely bound up with those of the head office that it would be
impossible to disentangle them on any strict basis of accounts.

Sweden

Feb. 23,
1983

Switzerland Jan. 11, 1983

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Thailand

Dec. 14,
1988

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Emirates

Sept. 24,
2003

Art. 31
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

June 21,
1979

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Kingdom

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Vietnam Oct. 26, 2005 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

SUDAN &
United Arab
Emirates

Mar. 18,
2001

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

SWEDEN &
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Tanzania May 2, 1976

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Thailand Oct. 19, 1988 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Trinidad and
Tobago

Feb. 1984

Tunisia May 7, 1981

Ukraine

Aug. 14,
1995

Venezuela Sept. 8, 1993

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam

Mar. 24,
1994

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Zambia

Mar. 18,
1974

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Mar. 10,
1989

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Thailand

July 9, 1999

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam

April 13,
1998

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

April 18,
1997

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Zimbabwe

TAIWAN &

MONGOLIA &
Poland

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
Singapore Oct. 10, 2002 State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Switzerland

Sept. 20,
1999

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Thailand

Aug. 17,
2006

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Emirates

Feb. 21,
2001

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”
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April 23,
1996

Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

July 1, 2002

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Vietnam May 9, 1996

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Kingdom

Ukraine

MAURITIUS &
Oman

Mar. 30,
1998

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Singapore

Aug. 19,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Sweden

April 23,
1992

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Zimbabwe Mar. 6, 1992

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

MALAYSIA &
United Kingdom

Dec. 10,
1996
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Art. 30
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”
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Mauritius

Aug. 23,
1992

Art. 26
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Syria

Feb. 26,
2007

Art. 29
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Turkmenistan

Nov. 19,
2008

Art. 27
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

United Arab
Emirates

Nov. 28,
1995

Art. 28
“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that Contracting
State from determining the profits to be taxed by such an
apportionment as may be customary…”

Yugoslavia

April 24,
1990

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

Dec. 26,
2006

“… nothing in paragraph 2 shall preclude that
Contracting State from determining the profits to be taxed
by such an apportionment as may be customary…”

KENYA &
Thailand
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